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DO START-UPS PAY LESS?
M. DIANE BURTON, MICHAEL S. DAHL, AND OLAV SORENSON*
The authors analyze Danish registry data from 1991 to 2006 to
determine how firm age and firm size influence wages. Unadjusted
statistics suggest that smaller firms paid less than larger firms paid,
and that firm age had little or no bearing on wages. After adjusting
for differences in the characteristics of employees hired by these
firms, however, they observe both firm age and firm size effects.
Larger firms paid more than did smaller firms for observationally
equivalent individuals but, contrary to conventional wisdom,
younger firms paid more than older firms. The size effect, however,
dominates the age effect. Thus, although the typical start-up—being
both young and small—paid less than a more established employer,
the largest start-ups paid a wage premium.
Policymakers around the globe have become interested in promotingentrepreneurship as a means of creating jobs and stimulating economic
growth. But there has been relatively little discussion about the quality of
the jobs start-ups create, particularly in terms of the salaries they pay
and the benefits they offer. If the process of creative destruction involves
replacing higher-paying jobs at incumbent firms with lower-paying ones at
start-ups, then a simple examination of the number of jobs created, even
net of jobs lost, may overstate the value of entrepreneurial activity to the
economy and society.
Although some research has examined the wages of start-ups, the find-
ings have been mixed and we cannot yet say with certainty whether start-ups
pay more or less than what established firms pay. Some of the inconsisten-
cies across studies arise from varying methodological choices. But some of
the uncertainty arises from flawed assumptions about the ways that firm age
and firm size relate to wages and from a failure to account for employee
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characteristics that influence both pay and the probability of joining a start-
up.
We study the extent to which pay varies as a function of firm age and firm
size using comprehensive registry data on the population of Danish workers,
from 1991 to 2006. We expand on the existing literature in four important
ways:
1) by estimating the age and size effects as categories, we allow firm age and
firm size to have flexible relationships with pay;
2) by focusing on new hires to the firm, we eliminate the extent to which varia-
tion in average job tenure might account for firm age and size effects;
3) by matching employees of smaller and younger firms with observationally
equivalent counterparts at large, established firms, we account for human
capital differences that might explain earnings differentials; and
4) by including fixed effects for fine-grained industry categories, we adjust for
the fact that firm age and size might vary with industry competitiveness and
employment growth.
Across our analyses, younger firms paid more than older ones, and smaller
firms paid less than larger ones. We document how methodological choices
have substantial implications for the estimated magnitudes of annual earn-
ings differentials across firms. First, our approach to treating firm age and
size as categories (bins) yields relationships as much as twice those found by
the standard approach that uses logged firm age and size as covariates.
Second, although focusing on new hires had little influence on the relation-
ship between firm size and pay, the differences in pay with respect to firm
age more than doubled once the confounding effects of employee tenure
had been eliminated. Third, factoring in differences in the human capital
characteristics of employees accounts for roughly one-third of the firm size
wage effect and almost two-thirds of the firm age wage effect. Industry
adjustments and other methodological choices, by contrast, make little dif-
ference to our wage estimates.
Through a variety of methodological adjustments, and consistent with
prior research, we find a firm size wage penalty. The smallest firms paid less
than the largest ones paid, by a factor of 10 to 15%. Somewhat unexpect-
edly, however, younger firms paid more than older firms (though by less
than 5%). In fact, large young firms appeared to pay a wage premium over
established employers. In most cases though, the size effect dominates the
age effect, meaning that the typical start-up—being both small and young—
pays less than the average incumbent employer.
Firm Age, Firm Size, and Wages
Young firms account for an outsized share of all net job creation in the
United States (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda 2013), in Denmark (Ibsen
and Westergård-Nielsen 2011; Malchow-Moller, Schjerning, and Sorensen
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2011), and in most other countries (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and
Maksimovic 2014; de Wit and de Kok 2014; Lawless 2014; Anyadike-Danes
et al. 2015). Yet, despite enthusiasm for entrepreneurship on the part of
policymakers and the evidence that start-ups account for the majority of net
job creation, there are reasons to be pessimistic about entrepreneurship as
an engine for creating good jobs and generating broad-based economic
benefits. For starters, firms typically begin small. But large firms enjoy
economies of scale and scope and can therefore increase employee produc-
tivity. Indeed, an extensive empirical literature has examined the relation-
ship between firm size and average compensation, finding that larger firms
pay more and offer better benefits than do smaller firms (for a review, see
Oi and Idson 1999).
Start-ups may pay less than older firms even independent of these size
effects. Fledgling firms have not had the opportunity to improve their oper-
ations through learning-by-doing (Arrow 1962) or by investing in equip-
ment (Thompson 2001). Nor have they had time to build social capital
(Sorenson and Rogan 2014). To the extent that these factors complement
production (Griliches 1969), start-ups should operate at lower levels of pro-
ductivity than more established firms and consequently pay their employees
less. Only a handful of studies to date, however, have examined the relation-
ship between firm age and wages, net of firm size effects. Troske (1998), for
example, reported that the youngest manufacturing plants in the United
States paid nearly 20% less than the oldest ones in the late 1980s, even after
adjusting for differences due to firm size. Similarly, Brixy, Kohaut, and
Schnabel (2007), examining evidence from Germany, found that newly
founded firms paid roughly 8% lower wages on average than did their older
counterparts in the late 1990s.
Although studies typically found that older firms pay more, on average,
than younger ones (Audretsch, van Leeuwen, Menkveld, and Thurik 2001;
Brixy et al. 2007), most of the studies informing our understanding of firm
age and wages have had information on only the average wages paid by
firms and therefore have been unable to adjust for differences in the char-
acteristics of the employees of start-ups relative to other firms. Start-ups may
prove less appealing to employees, however, because of their lower levels of
capital investment and uncertain prospects. Indeed, recent research has
documented that smaller and younger firms hire younger, less-educated,
and less-experienced individuals (Nystrom and Elvung 2014; Ouimet and
Zarutskie 2014). These employees have less human capital and would earn
less at any employer, young or old, large or small. The observed firm age
effects may therefore reflect differences in who firms hire rather than in
how much they pay.
Another complication to understanding firm age effects on wages stems
from the fact that employees gain firm-specific experience over time,
thereby increasing their value to their employers. Older firms have employ-
ees with longer tenure. The typical approach to this problem has been to
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assume that wages adjust linearly with firm tenure (e.g., Brown and Medoff
2003; Heyman 2007). But, given that younger firms and older firms do not
even overlap over most of the range of the tenure variable, that assumption
is often problematic. A two-year-old firm, for example, cannot have any
employees with more than two years of experience at the firm, but an estab-
lished firm might have few employees with less than two years of tenure at
the firm. Comparing average pay across firms of different ages conflates the
effects of firm age with those of employee tenure.
These methodological challenges imply that the apparent effects of firm
age and size on wages could stem more from employee selection and reten-
tion than from differences across firms in their productivity or ability to pay
(e.g., Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999). At least four studies have
addressed these issues. The studies have found conflicting results, particu-
larly with respect to the effects of firm age, which may reflect their differing
methodological choices. Brown and Medoff (2003), in the first study of this
type, included the characteristics of employees, firm age, and logged firm
size in estimates of the wages of 1,410 US workers. In initial specifications
that included only firm characteristics, they found average pay rising with
firm age. But this relationship flipped after they accounted for employee
characteristics.
Heyman (2007) and Nystrom and Elvung (2014), however, using registry
data from Sweden, both found that older firms paid somewhat higher
wages. Heyman (2007) took an approach similar to Brown and Medoff
(2003), including a variety of individual-level characteristics in a wage equa-
tion for roughly 500,000 employee-years observed in three cross sections
(1987, 1991, and 1995). Although he could adjust for firm-specific experi-
ence in only the latter two cross sections (by including a linear term for
tenure), in models adjusting for tenure, he found non-negative relation-
ships between firm age and pay. In the 1995 cross section, moreover, older
firms consistently paid more than the younger firms paid.
Nystrom and Elvung (2014), by comparison, adopted a propensity score
matching approach to adjust for an even larger set of employee characteris-
tics among a sample of more than 150,000 entrants to the labor market. By
definition, these individuals had no experience at the firm; the research
design, therefore, eliminated firm tenure as a potential confound. In con-
trast to other studies that have accounted for employee characteristics, how-
ever, their adjustments for employee sorting had little effect on the
estimated wage penalty of joining a young firm, perhaps because the models
they used to create propensity scores explained less than 2% of the variation
in who joined a start-up.
Schmieder (2013), meanwhile, found the opposite relationship between
firm age and wages using registry data from Germany, with young firms
offering as much as a 6% premium over older employers. To address the
tenure problem, Schmieder focused only on job changers (movers). To
adjust for heterogeneity in employees and employers, he used individual-
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level and firm-level fixed effects. His estimates therefore focused on the
changes in pay associated with moving across firms as those firms mature
and grow in size. Although his empirical approach addressed both the
tenure issue and the sorting of employees into firms, the German data that
he used primarily captured older and larger employers. To the extent that
firm age and size effects have decreasing marginal returns, his results may
have underestimated the overall importance of these firm characteristics.
He also did not allow firm age and size to interact in their determination of
wages.
As this brief review reveals, although scholars have begun to address how
wages vary with firm age and size, many questions remain. For example: Do
firm age and size effects follow the functional forms typically used? Do they
interact in their determination of wages? To what extent do the apparent
age effects confound firm age with employee tenure? To what extent might
unobserved heterogeneity either on the side of the employee or on the side
of the firm account for differences after adjusting for the observed charac-
teristics of employees and employers? Many studies, moreover, have treated
firms and establishments interchangeably without careful attention to distin-
guishing newly created firms from either foreign subsidiaries or expansions
of an existing enterprise. We tackle these questions below.
Empirical Strategy
To advance our understanding of the relationships between firm age, firm
size, and wages, and to explore whether start-ups pay more or less than
established firms, we examine Danish registry data, the Integrated Database
for Labor Market Research, commonly referred to by its Danish acronym,
IDA (for a useful English-language overview of the data, see Timmermans’
2010 paper). These data cover every employee in the country; we begin by
restricting the sample to full-time employees between the ages of 18 and 60
to focus on adults and on those who had not yet begun to shift their
employment choices in anticipation of retirement.
Although the IDA database begins in 1980, we consider only the post-
1991 period. In the late 1970s and 1980s, a series of regulatory reforms dis-
mantled most of the centralized wage-setting system, allowing firms much
more flexibility in their compensation practices (Madsen, Andersen, and
Due 2001). Denmark now has some of the least restrictive labor market poli-
cies in Europe (Bingley and Westerg˚ard-Nielsen 2003; Sørensen and
Sorenson 2007), usefully allowing comparison to larger economies such as
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Although Denmark
has made it easy to hire and fire employees, and has a flexible wage-setting
regime, the country nevertheless retains a strong social support net, a com-
bination sometimes referred to as flexicurity (Madsen 2004).
Unlike the setting in the United States, for example, in Denmark bene-
fits, such as health insurance and retirement plans, come from the central
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state rather than from employers. For our purposes, this model has the
advantage of ensuring that most of the differences between employers in
the quality of jobs stems from how much they pay, rather than from a com-
bination of wages and benefits.
Two additional features of the Danish context help to simplify our analy-
sis. First, the Danish tax system does not encourage the use of equity as a
form of compensation. Denmark taxes equity awards as income rather than
as capital gains. As a consequence, most companies use bonuses rather
than stock or stock options as a means of paying for performance
(Eriksson 2001). Eriksson (2001), moreover, found that small firms in
Denmark use equity compensation—as well as all other forms of variable
compensation—less than large firms do. Because bonuses appear as
income, our analyses should include all forms of compensation for the
vast majority of employees.
Second, Denmark has strong norms against long work hours. In 2015,
for instance, only 2% of Danish full-time workers reported working more
than 50 hours per week compared to an Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) average of 13% (OECD 2015).
Any observed annual pay differences therefore are not likely to reflect dif-
ferences in the number of hours worked.
Average Wages by Firm Age and Size
We first classify each employer into one of four full-time employee cate-
gories: 1 to 10, 11 to 49, 50 to 249, and more than 250 full-time employees.
We also classify each employer into one of four age categories: 1 to 2 years,
3 to 4 years, 5 to 8 years, and 9 or more years.1 Although we chose these
categories for their consistency with and comparability to the categories rou-
tinely applied to employers in the United States, we note that our age and
size characteristics refer to the firm (organization), not to the establishment
or plant (sub-unit).
We exclude foreign subsidiaries and other cases of incumbent firms cre-
ating new establishments. To err on the conservative side, we also remove
from the analysis start-ups in which a large proportion of the employees
had worked together in the prior year for an employer in the same industry
and region, but with a different firm identification code. Although this pro-
cedure likely eliminates some start-ups that had been founded by groups of
individuals from the same employer, treating some well-established entities
as start-ups seems more problematic than does the exclusion of a few
employee spin-offs.
1Occasionally, a firm had no employees associated with it for one or more years. For cases in which a
firm had no employees for a single year, we treat it as though it had been operating continuously. In
cases in which a firm had no employees for multiple consecutive years, we reset its age to 1 upon
reentry.
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Table 1 reports the median, mean, and standard deviation of the annual
earnings for all full-time employees, between the ages of 18 and 60, in each
of these size and age categories across the entire period, 1991 to 2006, for
our population of more than 12 million employee-years. We also report the
number of employee observations and the number of firms for each cate-
gory of firm age and size. Looking down the columns, one can see a clear
size gradient. Within each age range, larger firms paid more than smaller
ones. The smallest employers—those with 1 to 10 employees—paid their
employees 18 to 23% less than those with 250 or more employees. Looking
across the rows, patterns become more difficult to detect.
Movers
One of the most consistent complications noted in the prior literature on
the relationship between firm age and wages has been that older firms also
tend to employ individuals who have longer tenure with the firm (Brown
Table 1. Mean and Median Annual Earnings for All Employees
by Firm Size and Firm Age
Firm size bin 1–2 years 3–4 years 5–8 years 9+ years Total
1–10 employees
Mean 239,938 239,224 235,315 225,448 231,334
Median 216,996 216,217 214,478 210,107 212,791
Standard deviation 160,620 325,958 153,750 133,422 217,292
Observations 414,349 325,888 474,790 1,363,716 2,578,743
Number of firms 110,634 77,100 66,470 72,007 326,211
11–49 employees
Mean 278,311 282,161 281,200 265,256 270,050
Median 246,560 249,440 249,078 239,992 242,641
Standard deviation 185,361 188,510 184,084 160,083 179,867
Observations 208,350 221,110 405,741 1,861,437 2,696,638
Number of firms 8,720 8,445 9,930 16,293 43,388
50–249 employees
Mean 291,341 292,146 297,941 284,591 286,493
Median 253,899 252,599 257,594 251,433 252,176
Standard deviation 191,051 194,368 196,895 182,429 191,264
Observations 122,053 127,559 261,668 2,265,351 2,776,631
Number of firms 1,255 1,268 1,658 4,061 8,242
250+ employees
Mean 311,357 309,104 305,273 289,589 292,215
Median 283,171 279,605 270,175 255,302 258,268
Standard deviation 167,542 172,877 191,917 174,679 176,990
Observations 167,406 167,064 326,370 3,917,366 4,578,206
Number of firms 302 289 307 940 1,838
Total
Mean 268,688 272,397 274,698 274,273 273,794
Median 240,832 243,042 244,098 244,790 244,307
Standard deviation 176,584 228,829 182,432 163,723 189,494
Observations 912,158 841,621 1,468,569 9,407,870 12,630,218
Number of firms 120,911 87,102 78,365 93,301 379,679
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and Medoff 2003; Heyman 2007; Ouimet and Zarutskie 2014). Prior
research has typically dealt with this issue by including firm tenure as a
covariate. But if the returns to firm tenure decline over time or vary across
individuals, any linear adjustment for firm tenure may underestimate the
‘‘true’’ firm tenure effect and would then probably attribute a portion of
these tenure differences to firm age.
We adopt a quite conservative approach to addressing this issue by exam-
ining only new hires and the wages they earned. By definition, these individ-
uals have no prior experience in the firm; therefore, our estimates compare
similar individuals—at least in terms of firm tenure—across both young and
old firms. In particular, we restrict the sample to those who had worked for
a firm for at least 30 days but no more than one year. We exclude all indi-
viduals listed as founders, employers, or entrepreneurs, as their compensa-
tion may involve equity as well as wages. These restrictions reduce our
sample size, but still leave us with more than 3.1 million observations across
more than 260,000 firms.
Table 2 reports the median, mean, and standard deviations of the wages
for these recent hires as well as the number of observations and firms for
each age and size category. Note that Table 2 reports consistently lower
wages than Table 1, reflecting the fact that pay rises with firm tenure.
Reading down the columns, one continues to see the strong relationship
between firm size and wages, with the largest firms paying new hires 18 to
21% more than the smallest firms. But the pattern for firm age changes
noticeably. Looking across the rows, one now notices a negative relationship
between firm age and the average wages paid to recent hires. Within each
of the size categories, the oldest firms paid the lowest wages. The youngest
firms paid 9 to 13% more to new hires than did the oldest firms, and both
mean and median wages at firms in the youngest two age categories (4 or
fewer years old) consistently exceeded the overall mean and median for
each size category.
Adjusted Wages by Age and Size
Employee Sorting
Although restricting the sample to recent hires accounts for differences on
the most obvious dimension on which young and old firms differ—firm
tenure—employees might nonetheless sort into firms on a host of other
characteristics related to productivity and, therefore, also to expected wages.
We first explore the extent to which young and small firms differed from
the overall population of firms in terms of the individuals they hired.
Although past studies have reported differences between younger and older
firms in the characteristics of their employees (Nystrom and Elvung 2014;
Ouimet and Zarutskie 2014), the cross-sectional information on which those
studies have relied depends on the joint combination of differential hiring,
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maturation, and differential retention. Whether young firms, in fact, hire
different kinds of individuals therefore remains an open question.
Table 3 reports the demographic characteristics for the full population of
new hires and for two relevant subsets. The first column presents averages
across all firms for any new hire. The second column, meanwhile, restricts
this set to those hires coming from a business establishment that closed. We
include this group because one might worry that movers self-select into
moving and therefore differ in important ways from non-movers. Focusing
on those who had to find a new job because their prior establishment closed
should eliminate most—if not all—self-selection (Gibbons and Katz 1991;
Gruetter and Lalive 2009). Although our sample includes the service sector,
we refer to this subsample as the ‘‘plant closings’’ group. Note that our sam-
ple size falls dramatically from more than two million observations to fewer
than 215,000. Within this restricted set of involuntary movers, the means
and medians rise for all age and size bins, suggesting adverse selection on
Table 2. Mean and Median Annual Earnings for New Hires
by Firm Size and Firm Age
Firm size bin 1–2 years 3–4 years 5–8 years 9+ years Total
1–10 employees
Mean 221,932 212,674 207,906 199,925 209,133
Median 209,496 202,911 199,888 193,638 200,382
Standard deviation 140,783 128,440 123,108 112,021 126,512
Observations 142,098 84,950 105,506 216,144 548,698
Number of firms 63,030 40,195 38,360 46,720 188,305
11–49 employees
Mean 259,284 252,437 249,179 235,099 242,785
Median 237,420 232,509 230,577 220,225 225,746
Standard deviation 161,576 147,481 140,816 136,324 146,859
Observations 70,738 59,604 95,501 306,166 532,009
Number of firms 7,785 7,480 8,876 14,556 38,697
50–249 employees
Mean 274,507 264,220 266,412 253,423 257,130
Median 242,250 234,108 238,448 230,167 232,253
Standard deviation 190,235 172,847 155,758 146,250 167,119
Observations 33,856 30,255 58,874 363,947 486,032
Number of firms 1,118 1,155 1,530 3,818 7,621
250+ employees
Mean 298,975 276,950 267,888 258,301 262,858
Median 263,854 250,740 243,772 232,402 236,495
Standard deviation 187,801 141,998 148,116 152,463 158,600
Observations 42,794 28,501 62,318 496,044 629,657
Number of firms 275 269 298 889 1,731
Total
Mean 248,597 241,012 242,431 242,750 243,313
Median 228,186 222,936 224,518 223,062 223,939
Standard deviation 171,308 148,566 142,464 137,629 150,545
Observations 289,486 203,310 322,199 1,382,301 2,197,296
Number of firms 72,208 49,099 49,064 65,983 236,354
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average among movers. Adverse selection can also be observed by compar-
ing the average prior wages across the first and second columns in Table 3.
The next two columns report means for the subsets of all hires and of
plant closing movers shifting to young firms. The final two columns do the
same for those moving to small firms. Across all employee characteristics,
few differences exist between the populations of new hires in the first and
second columns and those going to young firms in the third and fourth col-
umns. Somewhat larger differences appear between smaller and larger
firms, comparing the first and second columns to the fifth and sixth col-
umns. Smaller employers, particularly in the plant closing group, hired less-
educated individuals, who had less labor market experience and longer
spells of unemployment. The compositional differences in who start-ups
hire, therefore, appears to be more of a size effect than an age effect.
Employee Matching
Although few prior studies have adjusted for these differences, those
that have done so have generally relied on adjustments through linear






Firm size bin All hires Plant closing All hires Plant closing All hires Plant closing
Age 34.02 37.15 34.42 37.09 33.88 36.15
(10.17) (10.68) (10.12) (10.61) (10.31) (10.86)
Female 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.34
(0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Months of education 148.31 147.79 148.51 147.65 146.71 144.98
(28.28) (29.24) (28.25) (28.97) (27.46) (28.06)
Type of education
Primary school 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.31
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46)
High school/gymnasium 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
(0.30) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Vocational training 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.46
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
College 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10
(0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.31) (0.30)
University 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.22) (0.20)
Labor market experience 13.80 16.04 13.65 15.55 13.53 14.62
(8.88) (9.26) (8.83) (9.19) (8.73) (9.09)
Unemployment history 1.27 1.13 1.34 1.18 1.37 1.42
(1.93) (1.84) (1.99) (1.89) (2.01) (2.06)
Ln(Prior wage) 9.22 10.10 9.11 9.99 9.00 9.17
(5.20) (4.67) (5.28) (4.74) (5.28) (5.19)
Observations 2,197,296 213,692 492,796 57,306 1,080,707 84,011
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
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regression. In other words, researchers estimated a wage equation, effec-
tively assuming each of the relevant human capital dimensions had additive
effects on the expected wage, or its logged value (e.g., Brown and Medoff
2003). Having data on the entire population allows us to adopt a more flex-
ible and non-parametric approach to adjusting for individual differences.
Rather than estimating a wage equation with linear adjustments for the
effects of age, gender, education, and other factors, we instead match on
these characteristics and include a fixed effect for each matched group.
Because the fixed effect adjusts for a specific combination of attributes, it
effectively allows these attributes, such as education and experience, to have
completely flexible relationships to earnings and to interact in their deter-
mination of wages (i.e., allowing the returns to one dimension of human
capital to depend on the others).
To minimize the possibility that a confounding factor accounts for the
results, one would ideally match cases and controls exactly on all relevant
observed dimensions. Of course, with continuous variables, this approach
proves impractical if not impossible as no two individuals have been born at
precisely the same instant, for example, nor do they earn exactly the same
amount. We therefore adopt a modified version of this approach, combin-
ing coarsened exact matching (CEM) on several dimensions with nearest-
neighbor matching on income in the previous year. Extended discussions of
the advantages of this approach are offered in Iacus, King, and Porro
(2012) and in King and Nielsen (2015).
Our matching procedure operates as follows. We treat each cell in the
firm age-size matrix as a subsample. For each employee within a subsample,
such as those beginning jobs at companies with 1 to 10 employees that have
been operating for 1 to 2 years, we find all observationally equivalent indi-
viduals in our baseline category of large, established firms (those beginning
jobs at employers with at least 250 employees and that have been operating
for at least nine years). We consider two individuals to be observationally
equivalent if they have the same gender (male/female), the same age
(coarsened to the year of birth), the same level of education (coarsened to
the highest degree: primary school only, high school or gymnasium, a voca-
tional training certification, undergraduate college, or graduate level), and
the same prior occupation (using the one-digit version of the occupational
codes for Denmark, which delineates 10 major occupational categories to
distinguish between skilled and unskilled jobs and between white- and blue-
collar occupations).2
Although this matching accounts for differences across employees on
some of the most important factors influencing wages, workers differ on a
host of difficult-to-observe dimensions that also affect productivity and pay.
2The number of available matches limited our ability to employ more fine-grained occupational cate-
gories at this stage. Including more-detailed two-digit occupational categories as fixed effects, however,
did not absorb much additional variance. This outcome is consistent with the results reported by
Schmieder (2013).
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Most of these factors should, however, remain relatively stable for a given
individual over relatively short intervals of time. We therefore use informa-
tion on the prior wages of individuals to account for these differences.
From the set of available individuals who matched exactly on gender, age,
education, and occupation, we include only the two nearest neighbors on
the prior year wage distribution—the closest observation above and the clo-
sest below what an employee earned in that previous year—in the compari-
son set. To achieve high-quality matches and ensure that the matching
estimator replicates the population average treatment effect (Abadie and
Imbens 2006), we match with replacement, meaning a control could serve
as a match for multiple focal individuals. This procedure yielded statistically
identical average wages across all sets of cases and controls.
Consider first, for example, the individuals who joined small (1–10
employees), young (1–2 years) firms (the top left cell in our tables). For the
142,098 ‘‘focal’’ individuals who joined these firms (see Table 2), we find
control individuals who joined large (250+ employees), established (9+
years) firms (the baseline category) in the same year, who matched the
focal individuals on age, gender, education, and prior occupation. For each
focal individual, we select the exact match closest but just above the person
in earnings (t + 1) and the exact match closest but just below in earnings
(t21) to form an observation triad. We successfully identify matches for
135,530 (98%) of the focal individuals.3
Adjusting for Human Capital
For each of our 15 matched samples, we estimate the effect of being in the
treated group (that is, not being employed by a firm in the oldest and larg-
est category). Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
LnðW iÞ=basASi+ gj+ Ei ;ð1Þ
where Wi represents the starting wage for individual i, ASi denotes a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 when the individual in question works for a
firm in the younger age and/or smaller size category, g represents a vector
of fixed effects specific to each triad j (i.e., a focal individual plus two
matched controls), and Ei denotes an individual-specific error term. By
adjusting for individual characteristics through a series of fixed effects, this
model controls flexibly for any shape the relationship between each of these
factors and wages might take, as well as for any interactions between these
characteristics in the determination of wages. Because both the cases and
the controls in each set changed jobs in the same year, these fixed effects
3In total, we have 15 sets of matched samples (one for each cell in the age-size matrix, except for the
baseline category), and we obtain a match rate of 97% or better across 11 of them. Our lowest match
rate, 78%, occurs in the smallest (1–10 employees) and oldest (9+ years) category.
1190 ILR REVIEW
also absorb any period effects, such as the business cycle. We repeat this
procedure for each of the 15 matched samples.
Table 4 reports the bas values from these 15 regressions. In the interest of
saving space, each cell in the table simply reports the bas coefficient and
standard errors for the regression using the relevant matched sample. We
also report the number of case-control triads used in each regression.
The value in each cell is the estimated pay for observationally equivalent
new hires in a firm in that particular age and size bin relative to the pay
offered in an established (9+ years), large (250+ employees) firm. Thus, for
example, the top left cell indicates that an individual hired by a firm in
the smallest, youngest group would receive an annual wage only 84%
(exp(–0.179) = 0.836) as large as a similar individual hired by a large, estab-
lished firm. Given that the average new hire in a large, established firm
earned about 258,300 Danish kroner (DKK), the comparable person hired
by the small start-up would earn about DKK 216,000, an annual difference
of approximately US$6,500.
Reading across the first row, all four firm age categories have negative
wage coefficients, revealing a sizable wage penalty for employees hired by
the smallest firms. The steepest gradient, moreover, appears as one moves
across the first two age groups. Reading these coefficient values down the
columns to compare wages in similarly aged firms of different sizes reveals a
strong positive size effect. Wage penalties decrease as firm size increases.
The size effects nevertheless appear larger for younger firms than for older
ones, suggesting that firm age and size interact to some extent in determin-
ing wages.
Table 4. Regression Matrix: New Hires Matched on Age, Gender, Education,
Prior Job, and Prior Earnings
Firm size bin 1–2 years 3–4 years 5–8 years 9+ years
1–10 employees –0.179* –0.204* –0.206* –0.192*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Triads 135,520 81,548 101,582 208,930
11–49 employees –0.046* –0.061* –0.062* –0.071*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Triads 68,300 57,598 92,550 297,818
50–249 employees –0.006 –0.013* –0.014* –0.019*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Triads 32,744 29,322 57,147 354,571
250+ employees 0.094* 0.041* 0.021*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Triads 41,319 27,603 60,507
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include fixed effects for each matched
triad of one individual from the treatment cell and two matched individuals from the baseline cell of
firms with 250 or more employees that are more than 9 years old.
*p\ 0.01.
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Notably, some start-ups paid wages equivalent to or higher than the
largest, most established firms. And, all three columns of the largest size
category (250+ employees) have positive wage coefficients. Start-ups, partic-
ularly those that begin large or become large rapidly, would appear to cre-
ate the highest-paying jobs. But how common are such firms and how
prevalent are these jobs? In terms of firms, recall that nearly 90% of firms
in the youngest column occupy the top-left cell, being both young and very
small. Low-paying start-ups therefore dominate the mix. But in terms of the
typical job offering, because the larger firms account for more jobs, the
numbers are more encouraging. Roughly one-quarter of jobs in start-ups
pay a premium over those of large, established firms.
Methodological Choices and Their Implications
Although our approach accounts for a variety of issues not addressed in pre-
vious studies, to what extent do the differences in our estimates (compared
to earlier ones) stem from our modeling choices rather than from our set-
ting? On the one hand, better accounting for firm tenure and employee
characteristics may address issues in the estimates found in prior studies.
On the other hand, Denmark may simply exhibit a distinct pattern of pay
with respect to firm age and size. Even the prior inconsistencies in the esti-
mates may stem not from the approaches used but from the fact that the
results have variously been from samples in the United States, Sweden, and
Germany.
To address these issues, we estimate the magnitudes of the firm age and
the firm size effects using a variety of methods to mimic prior research. We
summarize these results in Table 5. In the first column, we report the esti-
mated wage differential associated with moving from a start-up to a firm that
has been operating for 10 years. The second column shows the estimated









(1) Population (Brown and Medoff; Heyman) –2.52 12.69
(2) Movers (Brown and Medoff; Heyman) –3.68 16.98
(3) Population (bins) –3.96 33.14
(4) Movers (bins) –9.31 35.84
(5) + matched individuals (Table 4) –3.99 23.70
(6) + industry FEs –5.25 20.30
(7) Plant closings (bins, matched, industry FE) –4.79 23.78
(8) Movers (bins, matched, industry FE, future growth) –3.87 18.68
(9) Entrants (bins, matched, industry FE) –3.21 14.95
Note: FE, fixed effects.
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wage differential associated with moving from a firm with five employees to
one with 250. Each row corresponds to a set of estimation choices.
We first replicate the approach employed by both Brown and Medoff
(2003) and Heyman (2007). This model uses the full population as a sam-
ple, adjusting for a variety of employee and firm characteristics as covariates.
We estimate the effects of firm age and of firm size as log functions. As
noted above, accounting for employee tenure may represent one of the
most important adjustments, particularly when trying to understand the
effects of firm age. In the second row, therefore, we show results from the
same method but use the sample of job changers instead of including firm
tenure as a covariate. (Full results and a more detailed explanation of these
analyses are available in the online Appendix.)
Beginning with the third row, the table presents the various elements of
our modeling approach. It reports the results of the estimated effect sizes
using our approach to binning age and size. Although the splining used by
Heyman (2007), in his supplementary analysis, and by Schmieder (2013)
also allows for nonlinearity, the binning further allows for firm age and firm
size to interact in their determination of wages. Note that when calculating
the average effects of firm age and firm size in our binned models, the
reported values weight the effect in each row (column) according to the
number of jobs represented by that row (column). The third row reports
these estimates for the full population, the fourth row for only job changers
(movers). The fifth row reports estimates for the models that we report in
Table 4, on the sets of matched observationally equivalent individuals.
Comparing across these five rows, we see three effects. First, the binned
approach, with its flexible functional form, generally produces much larger
firm age and firm size effects. Two factors combine to produce this result:
1) the interactive effects of firm age and firm size, and 2) the rate of change
in the firm size–wage relationship. As shown in Table 4, the youngest firms
differ more in their wages as a function of size than do the oldest firms.
The largest firms also differ most in their wages as a function of age. Those
effects remain consistent across all variations of the models discussed below,
suggesting a strong interaction between firm age and firm size. In addition,
the effects of firm size reach an asymptote faster than a linear or log func-
tion would predict.
Second, focusing on job changers yields much larger effects, particularly
for firm age. The larger age effect likely stems from the linear effect for
tenure under-correcting for the relationship between firm tenure and pay.
Such an under-correction can lead to a positive bias in the estimates of the
relationship between firm age and wages. Note that, if the positive bias is
large enough, failure to account adequately for tenure effects could even
flip the sign of the firm age effect positive, such that older firms would
appear to pay more. In other words, using a linear adjustment for tenure
may account for Heyman (2007) finding a positive relationship between
firm age and wages.
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Third, adjusting for compositional differences in the characteristics of
the employees of firms of different ages and sizes accounts for a large share
of the average observed differences at the firm level—roughly one-third of
the size effect and more than one-half of the age effect. These results are
similar in magnitude to those reported by Brown and Medoff (2003) and
Heyman (2007). Failure to account for these differences, therefore, gener-
ally leads to an overestimation of the firm age and size effects.
Adjusting for Industry
Although the adjustments made up until this point address most of the fac-
tors that might confound the relationship between firm age and wages, they
do not account for the fact that the firm age and size distributions might
vary systematically across industries. New, rapidly growing industries, for
example, might have an unusual number of small, young firms. They may
also face a thin labor market in which talent commands a wage premium.
What appears to be a firm age or a firm size effect might then actually
reflect an industry effect on wages.
To account for the differences across industries, we re-estimate the mod-
els including fixed effects for four-digit industries. We find that the firm age
penalty increases slightly and the firm size premium declines somewhat. But
the addition of more than 500 industry intercepts notably has relatively little
effect on either the magnitudes or the patterns of the wage differentials.
Accounting for Selection into Mobility
Although our approach—considering only the wages of recent hires—has
the advantage of holding constant firm tenure, one might worry that these
job changers differed systematically on other factors from those who
remained with their employers. But the direction of this bias remains uncer-
tain. Whereas the least productive employees might be fired and need to
find new jobs, the most productive ones might move in search of more
attractive job opportunities.
To prevent such selection from influencing our estimates, we further
restrict the sample to include only those individuals who had left their
prior employers because the plant or business location at which they had
been working closed (‘‘plant closings’’). Although this restriction reduces
our sample size dramatically, it allows us to examine the subset of individ-
uals who plausibly sought employment for reasons exogenous to their
individual ability or productivity (Gibbons and Katz 1991; Gruetter and
Lalive 2009). Again, the general patterns of wage penalties and premia




Although our results suggest that the firm age and firm size effects remain
robust to a variety of modeling choices, unobserved heterogeneity is a
potential concern. For example, if firms can accurately assess the quality of
potential employees not captured in their prior wages, and if individuals
accurately evaluate the prospects of their potential employers, then assorta-
tive matching might be occurring—that is, the most productive employees
join the start-ups with the greatest potential. Perhaps the ‘‘sure bets’’ can
pay higher wages and therefore attract the best employees? Dahl and
Klepper (2015), for example, found that those firms with the best survival
prospects, based on the attributes of the founders and of the firm at the
time of its founding, paid somewhat higher wages than did firms with worse
survival prospects. Note that differences in the future prospects of firms
stem from a variety of possible factors. They might result from quality differ-
ences in the founders or their ideas. They could stem from externalities,
such as being located in an industrial cluster. Or they might reflect the
underlying ambitions of the founders of the firm. Although the industry
intercepts likely capture some of these differences, substantial variation
probably exists even within industries.
Unobserved Firm Characteristics
To address this possibility, we take advantage of the longitudinal nature of
our data. For each year of the sample and for each firm in the sample, we
consider its future growth for the next five years (defined in terms of the
number of employees in year t + 5 divided by the number in year t).
Schmieder (2013) also argued that growth rates should account for the
wage differential between young and old firms to the extent that those dif-
ferences emerge from older firms effectively having more bargaining power
vis-a`-vis employees. Although distinguishing monopsony from assortative
matching would prove difficult, for our purposes, we care simply whether
accounting for differential growth rates attenuates the observed negative
relationship between firm age and wages. Note that we do not have five-year
forward projections for all firms, because many firms fail. We exclude any
firms without t + 5 data from this analysis. To allow for a flexible relation-
ship between firm growth and wages, we use future growth to assign each
firm to a growth decile (across all firms in the sample for that year) and
include a vector of indicator variables to capture any wage differentials asso-
ciated with firm growth rates.
Although the general patterns with respect to firm age and firm size
remain the same, they do contract somewhat in magnitude—on the order
of 25% for firm age and 8% for firm size (see row (8) in Table 5). We note
that these results seem quite consistent with those of Gibson and Stillman
(2009). Using rich and detailed measures of worker skills, they found little
evidence that the sorting of better employees into larger firms could
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account for the firm-size wage effect. Our results also suggest that sorting is
unlikely to account for the firm-age wage effect.
Unobserved Employee Characteristics
Because the analyses above match individuals according to their wages in
their prior jobs, they effectively restrict the sample to those already in the
labor market. Although this approach has some advantages, in terms of
more tightly accounting for difficult-to-observe differences in human capital
and productivity, it potentially also raises some issues. Movers within this
sample, for example, may sort into larger or smaller firms and into younger
or older firms based on their prior labor market experience. Focusing
on involuntary movers—those employed at plants that closed—partially
accounts for these differences, but prior experience may still allow workers
to signal their quality.
We therefore estimate the wage premia and penalties again using only
new entrants to the labor market, following Nystrom and Elvung (2014).
Firms hiring labor market entrants necessarily have much weaker signals of
worker quality. This subpopulation should therefore have much less poten-
tial for sorting employees to employers on the basis of quality or productiv-
ity. Although these estimates parallel those for Table 4, plus industry fixed
effects, because these individuals have not had jobs, we could not include
nearest-neighbor matching on prior wages. Though somewhat smaller in
magnitude, the same pattern of results appears in this subpopulation (see
the last row of Table 5). Some form of assortative matching therefore seems
unlikely to account fully for either the firm age or the firm size effect.
Discussion
Do start-ups pay well? Our answer seems mixed: most do not, but a few do.
We explore the relationship between the amount that firms paid and firm
age and size among the population of Danish employers and employees
and find both a firm size effect and a firm age effect on the wages of new
hires. Larger firms paid recent hires more than smaller firms did, even for
observationally equivalent individuals who had earned roughly the same
amount in their previous jobs. In firms of similar size, however, young firms
actually paid recent hires more than older firms paid. But firm size had
larger effects than firm age. Hence, to the extent that start-ups begin both
young and small—nearly 90% of firms in our population do—they do tend
to pay less than large, established firms.
But those rare start-ups that begin large, or become large very quickly,
actually pay a premium relative to more established employers. Firms four
years of age or less with at least 250 employees paid substantial premia over
more established firms. Although these firms amounted to a small minority
of employers, because each of them hired hundreds of individuals, they
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accounted for roughly one-fifth of the jobs created by firms in their first
four years.
Our most novel finding, however, is that young firms paid more than
older ones did. Why might they have done so? One possibility is that start-
ups need to compensate for the greater instability of the jobs they offer.
Because the average start-up has a half-life of only four years, employees
face a substantial risk of losing their jobs as a consequence of the firm fail-
ing. Higher wages, therefore, may provide a compensating differential for
this instability. If they do, one might reasonably ask whether start-ups should
pay even larger premia. Not only do these firms fail at high rates, meaning
that employees may find themselves involuntarily unemployed or looking
for a job, but also the probability of failure likely rises during periods of eco-
nomic contraction, precisely the times during which laid-off employees
would find it most difficult to secure another job.
A second possibility is that start-ups, particularly those that start at a
larger scale or that grow rapidly, face labor market challenges that differ
from those facing established firms. In particular, start-ups may want to hire
numerous employees in a short period of time. They may therefore need to
offer something akin to signing bonuses to entice would-be employees
(Schmieder 2013). Although this explanation might account for a portion
of the differential, the fact that controlling for future growth had only a
modest effect on the relationship between firm age and wages suggests that
it cannot be the full story.
In addition to establishing a set of empirical facts about wages for the jobs
created by start-ups, we believe that our research offers multiple method-
ological contributions. First, we disentangle the effects of firm age and firm
tenure on wages by comparing new hires to all employees. In eliminating
the effects of firm-specific human capital accumulation, we reveal that prior
research that fails to account for employee tenure likely biases the estimates
toward finding a more positive relationship between firm age and wages.
Although this bias simply attenuates the negative relationship in our sample,
this bias might account for Heyman’s (2007) conclusion that older firms
pay more.
Second, we demonstrate that firm age and size are neither linearly (nor
log linearly) related to wages nor are they independent in their effects.
Instead, firm age and firm size jointly affect wages. Failure to accommodate
these interactions appears to lead to underestimation of the effects of firm
age and firm size. Although our strategy of binning firms into age and size
categories challenges common empirical practice, it accords well with the
idea that firms fall into conceptual categories (e.g., micro-enterprises, mit-
tlestand or SMEs, high-growth firms or gazelles). Though not a concern in
the Danish context, this approach can also account for the fact that laws
and regulations often come into play only above specific size thresholds (for
a thorough discussion of these thresholds in the United States, see Eyal-
Cohen 2013).
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Third, we provide additional evidence that human capital characteristics
can confound the effects of firm characteristics given that firms of different
ages and sizes draw from somewhat different labor pools. One of the diffi-
culties in assessing job quality is that one cannot determine whether one
job is better than another without understanding the characteristics of the
would-be occupants of those jobs. Being a truck driver, for example, might
pay well relative to the alternatives for someone lacking a high school
degree. Although the extant research has addressed this issue, the typical
approach to adjusting for jobholder characteristics has been to include the
observed characteristics of jobholders as covariates in a wage equation (or
in regressions on some other measure of job quality). That approach, how-
ever, has the limitation of essentially requiring one to assume that these
characteristics have additive (and usually linear or log-linear) relationships
to productivity and wages.
The increasing availability of longitudinal registry data, however, opens
the door for alternative approaches. The Danish data, for example, include
more than 20 million person-years of information. Instead of adjusting for
observed characteristics through regression, in the current study we use
matching to create sets of cases and controls nearly identical on the
observed dimensions and allow each group—with its potentially unique
combination of characteristics—to have its own intercept. Doing so allows
us to adjust for the characteristics of the employees without requiring any
assumptions about the functional forms of the relationships between these
characteristics and wages, or about the ways in which these attributes may
interact in determining wages.
Overall, these methodological issues appear sufficient to account for
apparent inconsistencies in the prior literature. But without estimating simi-
lar sets of models on data from each of the countries, one cannot say for
certain whether they do. Notably, Heyman (2007) found somewhat inconsis-
tent results even using the same method on different cross sections from
the same country. The relationships between firm age, firm size, and wages
likely also depend to some extent on the context.
Although our results provide some initial insight into the question of
whether start-ups create good jobs, they represent more of a first step in a
research agenda than a definitive answer. Consider some of the closely
related questions that remain open: Although young firms pay their employ-
ees a premium in the first year, how do these effects evolve? Do the employ-
ees of younger and older firms experience similar wage trajectories or do
their wages change at different rates? It would seem that these effects might
go either way. On the one hand, rapidly growing firms might promote
employees faster and give them larger raises. On the other hand, the man-
agers of young firms with higher probabilities of failure may invest less in
firm-specific human capital that would enhance their productivity over
time.
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Entrepreneurship has been and will continue to be an important driver
of economic vitality. As such, understanding better how the jobs created by
entrepreneurs affect the earnings and lives of the people who occupy them
will inform both policy and practice.
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